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ABSTRACT
Ireland’s Citizens’ Assembly (CA) of 2016–18 was tasked with making
recommendations on abortion. This paper shows that from the
outset its members were in large part in favour of the
liberalisation of abortion (though a fair proportion were
undecided), that over the course of its deliberations the CA as a
whole moved in a more liberal direction on the issue, but that its
position was largely reflected in the subsequent referendum vote





Empirical research on deliberative democracy has moved through a series of stages, the
most recent of which has entailed the study of real world deliberative mini-publics –
small groups of randomly selected citizens, operating according to deliberative principles
(including facilitated small-group discussions) and tasked with considering one or a
number of important policy, institutional or constitutional reform issues (e.g. Elstub,
2010, 2014; Goodin & Dryzek, 2006). Among the various forms of DMPs citizens’ assem-
blies are seen as ‘democratically superior’ (Elstub, 2014, p. 172). As Graham Smith (2009)
notes ‘[n]o other randomly selected body has been given the level of influence in the pol-
itical process’ (p. 75).
This was the situation facing the Irish Citizens’ Assembly in late 2016-early 2017 when
it deliberated on the topic of abortion – a controversial topic over which political and
public opinion was strongly divided. These were deliberations that occurred under the
glare of publicity and over a sustained period of time (across five weekends) making
this an unusual case for analysis. The abortion issue was complex, and one that
engaged intimately with the wider democratic process. Abortion was more than the
binary issue of no abortion (status quo) or abortion. The links with the wider democratic
system were clear: the Citizens’ Assembly’s recommendations in early 2017, that were in
favour of the liberalisation of abortion, were passed on to a special committee of the
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parliament (Oireachtas), which in turn decided to recommend a referendum and, follow-
ing the Assembly’s lead, drew up details of possible subsequent legislation. The govern-
ment and parliament concurred with the special committee, and a referendum was
called in the summer of 2018, which saw the removal of the abortion ban.
The fact that this Citizens’ Assembly was set up by, and run on behalf of, the govern-
ment, that it was discussing a hot topic under the glare of publicity and that its recommen-
dations were influential makes this an interesting case for study. This was a CA that had
significant policy influence, but how legitimate was it as a process? We assess a key dimen-
sion of this, by examining how representative the CA was of wider public opinion. Repre-
sentativeness is an issue of some debate among deliberative democracy scholars, who
promote quite different ideas on what it takes for a mini-public to be representative
(Brown, 2018; Kuyper, 2016; Steiner, forthcoming; Urbanati & Warren, 2008). We
address the representativeness of the CA in three stages by, first, examining the
opening position on abortion of the members recruited to the Assembly, second, the
dynamics of opinion formation resulting from the Assembly’s deliberations, and third,
the subsequent impact of the CA on the wider public. We show that, from the outset,
the CA’s members were in large part in favour of the liberalisation of abortion (though
a fair proportion were undecided), that over the course of its deliberations the CA as a
whole moved in a more liberal direction on the issue, but that its position was largely
reflected in the subsequent referendum vote by the population as a whole. We start in
section 1 with an overview of the Citizens’ Assembly and the context in which it operated.
Section 2 reviews our theoretical expectations and sets out key hypotheses. Our analysis is
developed in sections 3 and 4, followed by our conclusion.
1. The Irish Citizens’ Assembly and the Abortion Question
The Citizens’ Assembly was Ireland’s second government-sponsored deliberative mini-
public (Farrell, Suiter, & Harris, 2019), which in common with the genre (Harris, 2019;
Smith, 2009) was characterised by the random selection of its members (sortition) and
the use of trained facilitators to enable a deliberative process. In this instance the 99
members (the 100th member being an independent chair appointed by the government)
were tasked with making important recommendations on five key areas of policy and on
whether to call a referendum should the subject be on a matter of constitutional change.
Following common practice members were recruited randomly from the electoral register
by a market research company, RED C. The selection of the 99 citizens was stratified based
on four demographic targets: sex, age, social class and region, with the RED C recruiters
cold calling door-to-door to select the 99 members, and – at the same time – 99 substitute
members.
First on its agenda was the issue of whether to recommend the removal of a controver-
sial 1983 amendment to the Constitution, the so-called ‘Eighth Amendment of the Con-
stitution’, which gave explicit recognition to the right to life of an unborn child, effectively
introducing a constitutional ban on abortion in Ireland. Having being inserted into the
Constitution (as Article 40.3.3) in 1983 it needed a referendum to either repeal or
replace it (Suiter, Farrell, & Harris, 2018).1 This question was considered by the Citizens’
Assembly over a period of five weekends from November 2016 to April 2017. The reason it
was selected as the first issue reflected the growing pressure in Ireland and internationally
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for action to deal with the abortion ban. In the light of the successful referendum on mar-
riage equality in 2015 (Elkink, Farrell, Reidy, & Suiter, 2017), activists campaigning for the
liberalisation of abortion saw an opportunity to press the government – a new minority
coalition government elected in 2016 – to once and for all move on this issue (Field,
2018; McGraw, 2018). With opinion polls indicating strong support for a liberalisation
of Ireland’s abortion laws, the government felt forced to act. Needing the support of an
independent member of parliament who prioritised this topic as a condition of her
joining the coalition government, the minority government proposed that this be the
first item to be discussed by the Citizens’ Assembly.
The Citizens’ Assembly followed the same modus operandi as its antecedent Ireland’s
Convention on the Constitution (Suiter, Farrell, & Harris, 2016).2 Briefing papers were cir-
culated days in advance. The expert presentations were designed to be as objective as poss-
ible; though on occasion there were experts with differing perspectives pitched against
each other. There were also presentations by advocacy groups and personal testimonials.
The presentations were followed by question and answer sessions and then by small group
roundtable discussion, facilitated by trained moderators. A secret-ballot vote was held at
the end of the process with the members voting overwhelmingly to replace the article with
a new provision explicitly authorising the Irish parliament to legislate for abortion and, of
great surprise to watching pundits, for a very substantial liberalisation of abortion
provision.
2. Theory and Hypotheses
We can envisage the operation of a citizens’ assembly in a number of stages. The first of
these is how it is established, which covers a number of themes such as the design of the
CA, the recruitment of its members, the setting of its agenda, and so on (cf. Farrell, Curato,
et al., 2019; Suiter & Reuchamps, 2016). Given our central interest in the representative-
ness of the CA, we focus on the selection process, and in particular on the attitudes of the
sample selected as members and whether their views on abortion were in line with wider
public opinion. As we discuss, the sample was descriptively representative of the Irish
population, which is as expected for a deliberative mini-public, but to what extent was
it attitudinally congruent on the question of changing the constitution to introduce abor-
tion (Parkinson, 2006)?
A second stage is the operation of the CA: how it is run as a process, the quality of the
deliberation, how the views of members evolve over the period. We focus on the latter in
this paper. By becoming members of the CA, these ‘citizen representatives’ were in a pos-
ition to provide ‘supplements to elected representative bodies’ (Urbanati & Warren, 2008,
p. 405), to operate ‘as a sort of clearinghouse for expert knowledge’ (Brown, 2006, p. 215).
It is of interest, therefore, to track how the members’ views on abortion developed across
the five weekends of discussion.
A third stage, is what happens after the work of the CA has concluded. Its recommen-
dations, as we have seen, were influential in the decision to call the abortion referendum as
well as the wording of the question put to the wider citizenry. As scholars have noted a
deliberative mini-public ‘models what the electorate would think if, hypothetically, it
could be immersed in intensive deliberative processes’ (Fishkin, 1991, p. 81), it helps to
bridge ‘the gap between actual public opinion and well informed public opinion’ (Park,
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Jowell, & McPherson, 1998, p. 2). The paper concludes with some discussion about how
the views of the Citizens’ Assembly were reflected in the voting decision of Irish voters in
the referendum that followed.
We start with the selection process. The principle underlying a deliberative mini-
public is that the use of random selection (or sortition) should produce good ‘descriptive
representation’, where the participants are seen as a good mirror of wider society (for
more see Farrell & Stone, 2020). This is intertwined with the quality of deliberation,
with the aim of ensuring the inclusion of all perspectives on a topic for reasons of fair-
ness and epistemological completeness (James, 2008; Pearse, 2008). Citizens’ assemblies
are therefore seen to derive much of their legitimacy from their descriptive similarity to
the wider population (Brown, 2006, 2018). There are, however, limits to how close one
can get to this ideal, particularly when, as in this case, we are dealing with such a small
sample (99 lay citizens), requiring the use of stratified random selection rather than pure
random selection (Fishkin, 2018). This may result in a skewed sample. Filling pre-
defined demographic quotas inevitably means that not all traits are covered (e.g. edu-
cation), or they’re covered imperfectly (e.g. too many young participants recruited
from urban areas). As Parkinson notes: ‘not every group will have a black member,
not every group will have someone from an isolated rural community, not every
group will have a young mother on welfare’ (2006, p. 79). This leads him to recommend
that socio-demographic quotas should be filled equally rather than proportionate to the
population.
But even if the socio-demographic quotas are filled correctly (as happened in this case)
that does not necessarily mean that the views of the sample are in sync with those of the
wider public – one reason why a number of recent deliberative mini-publics have also
taken into consideration the political positions of potential participants, usually in the
form of a question eliciting their views on the matter to be discussed (Paulis, Pilet,
Panel, Vittori, & Close, 2020, p. 10).3 For example, at its recruitment stage the Brexit Citi-
zens’ Assembly (2017) asked potential participants how they had voted in the Brexit refer-
endum. This approach emphasises attitudinal congruence on the issue at hand, differing
from Dryzek’s (2001) discursive approach that includes all viewpoints and discourses on
the matter.
With all this in mind, we turn, in the first instance, to an examination of the extent to
which the Assembly members’ views on abortion were in line with those of the wider
population: the members may have been descriptively representative of the wider popu-
lation, but were they attitudinally congruent on this topic? It is evident from opinion
polls that the minds of most voters were already made up on this issue long before the
2018 referendum. For instance, in a survey of a representative sample of voters leaving
the voting booths in the February 2016 general election, a clear majority of respondents
favoured change: on an 11-point scale from 0 (total ban on abortion) to 10 (abortion
freely available to all women), 46 per cent of respondents were in the 7–10 range; the
mean was 6.07.4 Similarly, a survey question on the issue put to a nationally representative
sample during the period of the Citizens’ Assembly’s deliberations in early 2017 found a
large majority in favour of ‘repealing the 8th amendment’ – 62 per cent were in favour.
(This survey is discussed below.) Thus, there is a possibility that from the outset minds
were already made up among the bulk of Citizens’ Assembly members that Ireland’s abor-
tion laws needed to be liberalised.
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Earlier studies have found evidence that people of a liberal disposition are more
inclined to engage with deliberative activities (e.g. Christensen & von Schoultz, 2018;
Jacobs, Cook, & Carpini, 2009; Karjalainen & Rapeli, 2015). There is reason to expect
that this would be even more likely in this instance, not least given the high publicity
around the time of the establishment of the Citizens’ Assembly. The bulk of its
members were recruited in October 2016. They were explicitly made aware of the issues
they would be discussing and were also given a booklet outlining the main themes. In
addition, during the recruitment process all potential members were asked if they had
acted or intended to act in an advocacy role for any interest or lobby group campaigning
on any of the issues to be considered by the Assembly. This was asked of potential
members again during the validation phone call with the market research agency. Any
potential members who answered yes to these questions were excluded from the process.
While this approach to ensuring that the membership excluded advocates from either
side made good sense from organisational and wider political-sensibility perspectives,
there is a risk that it may have inadvertently resulted in some people choosing to exclude
themselves from the process. This recalls the ‘spiral of silence’ argument first developed
by Noelle-Neumann (1984), which relates to the tendency of people to remain silent
when they feel their views are opposed to the majority. This argument is generally
applied to survey research where the focus is on whether respondents to surveys may not
give true responses; more recently there has been interest in the potential for some individ-
uals who may be ‘too shy’ to even respond to surveys in the first place – seen by some as a
factor behind polling errors in trying to predict elections and referendum results.5 There are
grounds for speculating whether this question of individuals’ unwillingness to engage in
certain activities (e.g. Scheufele & Eveland, 2001) – sometimes referred to as ‘social desirabil-
ity bias’ – might also have occurred in this instance. Prospective members were informed
that they would be discussing abortion, which is of course a contentious topic. In addition,
there was significant media attention being paid to the Assembly and even more particularly
to the debate surrounding the ‘repeal of the 8th amendment’ (the core argument of those
seeking abortion reform in Ireland). This media attention built significantly in October
2016 just around the time when the members were being recruited (see Figure 1). Research
Figure 1. Mentions of the ‘8th amendment’, ‘citizens’ assembly’ and both in the Irish media, 2016.
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has shown that degree of perceived partisan bias in mainstream media coverage on an issue
is positively related to the intensity of media indignation and levels of incongruity between
one’s own opinion and perceived majority opinion (Hwang, Pan, & Sun, 2008). In this case
wemight expect that those who were liberal on abortion might have been more likely to sign
up for the Assembly, while those who were conservative may have felt themselves out of step
with the ‘climate’ of majority opinion (Noelle-Neumann, 1984), and hence less likely to sign
up. This leads us to our first hypothesis:
H1 There was an inbuilt majority among the Citizens’ Assembly members that, from the start
of the proceedings, was already in favour of abortion reform.
Our second area of interest is about the dynamics of members’ views over the course of the
five weekends of deliberation. We believe it is important to examine this question as it pro-
vides an indication of how enlightened public opinion might evolve on the basis of the
information and opportunity presented by a deliberative process (Fishkin, 2009), thus
offering a clue to how more informed members of the wider public might react in the
referendum that followed – a point we return to in our conclusion. As ‘citizen represen-
tatives’ (Urbanati & Warren, 2008, p. 405) or ‘nonelectoral representatives’ (Kuyper,
2016), the members of the Citizens’ Assembly were asked to play an important role in
what Kuyper refers to as the ‘public space’ (2016, p. 312), and therefore, as he puts it, it
is ‘empirically and normatively compelling’ to examine the role of ‘deliberative argumen-
tation [in altering their] interests and positions’ (2016, p. 321).
Our starting point flows from the first hypothesis over the inbuilt majority among the
Assembly members who were in favour of liberalising abortion. According to some
authors this could have led to a situation in which dominant majority voices were able to
drive the agenda (e.g. Mendelberg, 2006; cited in Farrar, Green, Green, Nikerson, & Shewfelt,
2009). For instance, Sunstein (2002) sets out a ‘law of group polarisation’, referring to the
situation where there is a group with rather skewed views on a hot topic and the majority
position drives things so that over time all converge on the majority position. This can result
in a situation where ‘groups often make more extreme decisions than would the typical or
average individual in that group’ (Sunstein, 2002, p. 178), which is generally seen to occur for
several reasons, such as a desire of members of the minority to win social acceptance or their
greater exposure to the dominant argument (for discussion, see Farrar et al., 2009).
The fact that both Mendelberg’s (2006) and Sunstein’s (2002) studies were focussed on
juries, as opposed to DMPs, has left them open to challenge (Luskin, Fishkin, & Jowell,
2002; Setälä, Grönlund, & Herne, 2010). In their work on group polarisation and
enclave deliberation on the contentious topic of immigration in a Finnish mini-public
Grönlund, Herne, and Setälä (2015) found no ‘systematic patterns of group polarisation
in the like-minded groups’ (p. 1013; also Strandberg, Himmelroos, & Grönlund, 2019).
But, more significantly in terms of our research, depolarisation led to more permissive
views amongst those who were initially against immigration. This speaks to a wider
debate about the liberalising effect of deliberative processes, with some seeing it as the
product of an inherent liberal bias in deliberation (e.g. Kuran, 1998) whereas others put
it down to the participants simply becoming more enlightened (Dahl, 1989; for discussion,
see Gastil, Bacci, & Dollinger, 2010).
Since we are assuming that there was an inbuilt majority in favour of liberalising abor-
tion, our expectation here is that the primary movement of opinion in the Irish Citizens’
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Assembly was from among those who were undecided or against abortion, in both
instances moving in a more liberal direction. If this occurs, it might be seen to lend
some support to the majority effect, as argued by Mendelberg (2006) and Sunstein
(2002). But it could just as easily be a product of the liberalising effect of deliberation.6
Our second hypothesis, therefore, is:
H2 Members who at the start of the proceedings were against abortion reform or undecided
on the issue shifted towards a more liberal stance.
It should be noted that there were specific limitations on our research design. The topics
for discussion (in this case the abortion topic) were set by the government, as were details
relating to timescale and deadlines, and the resourcing of the operation. The Citizens’
Assembly secretariat were responsible for recruiting the members, tendering for the facili-
tation process and monitoring how that operated, and the detail of how the Citizens’
Assembly would be run week-by-week. The expert advisory group, the steering group
and the secretariat were responsible for selecting and briefing the expert witnesses, agree-
ing the schedule for each weekend of meeting, and the seating arrangements of the
members. We were not privy to the details of any of this. Furthermore, our survey ques-
tions had to be agreed with the Chair and Secretariat. This, for instance, meant that we
were not allowed to ask the members their views on abortion until the third weekend;
more generally there were limitations on the length of our surveys and on certain ques-
tions that could be asked. In short, therefore, while this study has the considerable advan-
tage of being a fascinating case study of an important process of national-level
deliberation, as a research project it faced some tight constraints. This is reflected generally
in the variables available to us, and particularly relating to our main question of interest –
attitudes to abortion.
Our method of operation was to have paper-based surveys distributed to all members
by the Assembly Secretariat on two occasions each weekend, the first on Saturday morning
(our ‘Saturday’ survey) which were picked up by the Secretariat staff by the end of the first
session that morning, and the second towards the end of Sunday session (our ‘Sunday’
survey). Even though these are not quite ‘before-and-after’ surveys as typically used in
Deliberative Opinion Polls, we believe that they provide at least a good indication of
members’ views towards the start of their weekend of deliberations and towards the end.
3. Measuring the ‘Starting Position’ of the Citizens’ Assembly Members
We start with an analysis of the ‘starting position’ on abortion of the Citizens’ Assembly
members. The survey question asked of the members was: ‘Can we ask what you think
about the following statement: The current constitutional position on abortion should
remain as it is’. The members were asked to indicate their position on a five-point scale
ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’.7
Table 1 reports the views of the members on this abortion question. We deal with the
trends over time later, but for now we focus on the ‘starting position’ of members on the
Saturday of week 3. Eighty-eight members responded to the Saturday survey in week 3:
eight were opposed to change (conservative), 26 were undecided, and 55 were in favour
(liberal) – the latter representing 62 per cent of members. The top row in Table 1 also
reports the results of a question asked of a nationally representative survey that was
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implemented at the same time as the Assembly was deliberating on abortion,8 giving an
early indication of how the Citizens’ Assembly members compared with the greater
Irish population. This shows a small number of respondents who were against abortion
reform (i.e. were on the conservative side) in the Citizens’ Assembly compared to the
poll: just 9 per cent of the members agreed or strongly agreed with the proposal that
the constitutional position on abortion should remain as it is, whereas 23 per cent of
the respondents in the national poll were against abortion reform.9 Also apparent from
these trends is the large number of undecideds – both in the national sample and
among the Citizens’ Assembly members – suggesting that many minds were still open
on this issue.
As noted above, a limiting factor in our analysis is that our data on the ‘starting pos-
ition’ of the members refer to the third week of the Citizens’ Assembly. Given that we
were unable to ask the members their position on abortion in the first two weeks, we
needed to find alternative ways of trying to elucidate their starting position on this. Pre-
vious work on the moral position of respondents to Irish surveys led us to propose some
alternative items that we were allowed to include in our surveys from week 1. One was
particularly of interest: whether the members felt that ‘The Constitution in its current
form should be changed’. This has the same 5-point scale of responses. Given the focus
of their discussions on the highly salient issue of whether to change the constitutional
ban on abortion, there was good reason to anticipate a strong relationship between
views on this general question on constitutional reform and the specific one on consti-
tutional reform relating to abortion.
To test the robustness of this relationship we asked this general constitutional change
question in our nationally representative survey. The survey revealed that there was a
strong relationship between the two variables. As Table 2 reports, 89 per cent of the
respondents who were in favour of ‘repealing the 8th amendment’ (i.e. the liberal position
on abortion) very strongly agreed that ‘the constitution in its current form should be
changed’; and 72 per cent of those in favour of abortion reform were strongly in favour
that the constitution in its current form should be changed. We also explored this relation-
ship over the course of the Citizens’ Assembly, comparing responses to the abortion
Table 1. How the Citizens’ Assembly members compared with the national sample on the issue of
abortion.
‘If there was a referendum tomorrow to “repeal the 8th amendment” that is, to
remove the ‘right to life of an unborn child’ how would you vote?’





38% (389) 23% (240) 23% (235) 16% (165) 1029
‘The current constitutional position on abortion should remain as it is’
Strongly
Disagree







Week 3 Sat 38% (34) 24% (21) 28% (25) 2% (2) 7% (6) 1% (1) 89
Week 3 Sun 51% (43) 24% (20) 14% (12) 5% (4) 6% (5) 1% (1) 85
Week 4 Sat 48% (39) 37% (30) 10% (8) 4% (3) 2% (2) 0% (0) 82
Week 4 Sun 56% (47) 23% (19) 15% (13) 2% (2) 1% (1) 2% (2) 84
Week 5 Sat 52% (47) 25% (23) 9% (8) 8% (7) 3% (3) 3% (3) 84
Week 5 Sun 62% (54) 24% (21) 5% (4) 2% (2) 3% (3) 3% (3) 87
Source: Surveys of Citizens’ Assembly members; Ireland Thinks national survey, February-March 2017
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question and the general constitutional reform question. As Table 3 shows, there is a
strong clustering of Assembly members’ views on the change-side for both questions.
Although this is based on repeated measures of the same individual, the spearman corre-
lation coefficient here is −0.54, suggesting that the two are highly correlated.
This allows us to explore how the Citizens’ Assembly members compared with the
overall population on the issue of constitutional change generally: Table 4 shows that
the Citizens’ Assembly members deviated from the overall population. In our national
survey 22 per cent disagreed (disagreed or strongly disagreed) with constitutional
Table 2. Relationship between general and abortion-specific constitutional reform questions in a
survey of Irish citizens.
‘If there was a referendum tomorrow to “repeal the 8th amendment”, that is to remove
“the right to life of an unborn child” from the constitution. How would you vote?’
(Weighted counts)
For Against % For Rather not say Don’t Know
"The Constitution in its current
form should be changed"
Strongly Disagree 8 18 30% 1 3
Disagree 45 83 35% 32 36
Neither Agree nor Disagree 74 57 56% 57 77
Agree 170 65 72% 64 107
Strongly Agree 93 11 89% 12 16
Source: Ireland Thinks national survey, February-March 2017; N = 1,029.
Table 3. Relationship between general and abortion-specific constitutional reform questions in
repeated observations of individual members of the Irish Citizens’ Assembly.







‘The Constitution in its current
form should be changed’
Strongly
Disagree
0 3 0 0 0
Disagree 1 0 1 2 3
Neither Agree
nor Disagree
3 2 9 29 34
Agree 2 0 11 13 40
Strongly Agree 0 0 0 2 24
Table 4. How the Citizens’ Assembly members compared with the national sample on the issue of
constitutional reform.











13% (133) 39% (405) 26% (265) 19% (196) 3% (30) 1,029 3.40
Week 1 Sat 16% (12) 37% (28) 41% (31) 4% (3) 1% (1) 75 3.63
Week 1 Sun 33% (24) 27% (20) 33% (24) 7% (5) 0% (0) 73 3.86
Week 2 Sat 19% (15) 38% (30) 36% (29) 5% (4) 3% (1) 80 3.68
Week 2 Sun 33% (26) 31% (24) 27% (21) 8% (6) 1% (1) 78 3.87
Week 3 Sat 27% (24) 30% (27) 37% (33) 2% (2) 3% (3) 89 3.75
Week 3 Sun 40% (34) 26% (22) 18% (15) 12% (10) 4% (3) 84 3.88
Week 4 Sat 33% (27) 38% (31) 22% (18) 6% (5) 0% (0) 81 3.99
Week 4 Sun 45% (37) 33% (27) 18% (15) 4% (3) 0% (0) 82 4.20
Week 5 Sat 40% (36) 33% (30) 19% (17) 7% (6) 2% (2) 91 4.01
Week 5 Sun 45% (38) 27% (23) 19% (16) 7% (6) 2% (2) 85 4.05
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change compared with 5 per cent of Assembly members; though again it is instructive to
note the large numbers of undecided – 26 per cent in the national survey and 41 per cent of
Assembly members. The table also reports the mean scores (‘weighted agreement’),
showing notably more agreement that the constitution should be changed among CA
members in the first week (3.63) than the wider population (3.40), a difference that steadily
increases as the weeks unfold.
Given the relationship between this general measure of attitudes to constitutional
change and the specific constitutional reform question on abortion, this suggests that at
the outset of its deliberations the Assembly had relatively few opponents to constitutional
change in relation to abortion compared to the population as a whole. This would seem to
lend support to the argument (H1) that the Citizens’ Assembly had an inbuilt majority in
favour of abortion from the start of the proceedings, though the large proportions of unde-
cided reveals a willingness to make up minds later among a substantial portion of the
members.
4. The Development of Members’ Attitudes Towards Abortion Over Time
The next stage, then, is to examine how opinions developed on the abortion question over
the course of the Assembly’s work. The trends in Figure 2 are quite revealing. The graph
Figure 2. Trends on abortion from start of week 3 to end of week 5.
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on the top left summarises the overall trend over the course of six time points from Satur-
day inWeek 3 to Sunday in Week 5. The Citizens’ Assembly members, having started with
a strong liberal position on abortion in week 3 (as we discussed in the previous section), by
the end of the process had become even more liberal on average – albeit quite marginally
so; the movement was towards a more liberal position though not quite to the furthest
extreme. The remaining graphs in Figure 2 indicate that the reason for the change was
due to large shifts among those who were undecided, and also among the small
number of members holding to a conservative position, both sets moving in a more
liberal direction.
We can explore whether this change is significant or a function of random error by
employing a statistical test. We compare the attitudes of individual members at the very
start (Saturday of week 3) and at the very end of this period (Sunday of week 5) using
a paired test, the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test. This form of test can decide whether the
corresponding data population distributions are identical without assuming them to
follow the normal distribution. In this case, we are exploring differences in non-normal
responses to a likert scale question. Using the 74 cases that responded at both time
points the test estimates a p-value of 0.026, indicating that the distributions are indeed sig-
nificantly different.
In order to examine the trends more systematically, we employ a multi-level regression
analysis10 that seeks to account for how opinions shifted on the abortion question over
time. It is important to employ a multi-level model to capture changes in individual
respondents over time, particularly as there was a degree of membership turnover from
one weekend to the next.11 To track changes in attitudes we control for the member’s
initial attitude, that is their attitude from the first meeting they attended.
Table 5 reveals statistically significant p-values in respect of the relationship between
the ‘session’ (survey time point) and position on abortion (our dependent variable)
while accounting for the individual member’s starting position on abortion. The
‘session’ variable we use as a proxy for the effect of the Citizens’ Assembly on the
Table 5. Explaining evolving abortion position in terms of abortion position at the start of week 3.
Random effects:
Groups Name Variance Std.Dev.
identifier (Intercept) 0.05848 0.2418
Residual 0.11222 0.335
Number of obs: 431, groups: identifier, 83
Fixed effects:
Estimate Std. Error df P-Value
(Intercept) 1.001 0.413 419.3 0.016 *
Starting Position (2) −0.041 0.553 418.8 0.941
Starting Position (3) 0.767 0.473 418.8 0.106
Starting Position (4) 2.074 0.448 419.0 0.000 ***
Starting Position (5) 4.250 0.429 419.2 0.000 ***
Session 0.048 0.104 409.8 0.643
Starting Position (2): Session 0.295 0.131 391.5 0.025 *
Starting Position (3): Session 0.330 0.116 403.1 0.005 **
Starting Position (4): Session 0.245 0.111 405.4 0.027 *
Starting Position (5): Session −0.132 0.107 407.7 0.216
—
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05
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member, the accumulation of engagement with the Citizens’ Assembly influencing their
attitudes on the topic being discussed.
Interaction terms with categorical variables are often difficult to easily interpret as inter-
actions cancel out main effects and significance is only interpreted with respect to their
base level. The effects plots in Figure 3 more clearly convey the nature and significance
of the relationship between an individual’s starting position and their position on any
given week. Those who were more undecided were more likely to change their view
and broadly that change was in the direction of the more liberal perspective as the
weeks wore on. There were few members with starting positions 1 or 2 (against abortion),
and so the main driver of change in the Citizens’ Assembly was in the shift among those
who were undecided at the start of the process. These findings provide support for hypoth-
esis 2.12
The significant shift in views among those undecided on the issue raises a question over
whether lower levels of knowledge or information may be an underlying feature.13 We
know from previous research that those with lower levels of knowledge tend to shift
their opinions more than those with more knowledge (e.g. Herne, Christensen, & Grön-
lund, 2019; Suiter, Farrell, & O’Malley, 2016; Zhang, 2019). In this instance, however, we
found no evidence that those with lower self-reported knowledge changed their views
more than other members. But we did find some evidence of a relationship with levels
of education: those without a university level degree appeared to be more numerous
among those who changed their mind.14 This is shown by looking at the absolute
change in the member’s position between session 1 in week 3 and the final session in
week 5, while controlling for the relative scope for changing position (that is, the absolute
difference between the starting position and 1 or 5). The results in Table 6 reveal that those
without a university degree were significantly more inclined to change their views. This is
graphically displayed in the effects plot that follows in Figure 4.
Figure 3. Effects plots of shifts in position on abortion based on members’ starting positions on abor-
tion in week 3.
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5. Conclusion: The Citizens’ Assembly and the Maxi Public
The Irish Citizens’ Assembly’s deliberations on abortion show the challenges for a DMP in
dealing with a hot topic in the full glare of publicity.15 This certainly impacted on the
recruitment phase, which saw the members being recruited in a context of intense
media commentary on what they were about to discuss. Prospective members were
directly informed about the topics they would be asked to deliberate on, foremost on abor-
tion but also on the other topics that would follow. Our analysis indicates that those of a
more conservative tendency on the abortion question seem to have opted to exclude
themselves from the process, thus somewhat skewing the membership on this important
issue. Though an important caveat is the large number of members who at the outset had
not yet made up their minds on the issue. Our first hypothesis, therefore, is partially
confirmed.
There may have been issues with the recruitment process, but in other respects the indi-
cations are that it was a well-run deliberative process (Farrell, Suiter, Harris, &
Table 6. Education levels and absolute change in members’ position on abortion.
Estimate SE P-Value
(Intercept) 0.257 0.047 0.000 ***
Scope for Change 0.372 0.053 0.000 ***
University Degree −0.131 0.065 0.042 *
Scope for Change: University Degree 0.026 0.073 0.721
—
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05
Residual standard error: 0.5069 on 385 degrees of freedom
(16 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared: 0.2307, Adjusted R-squared: 0.2247
F-statistic: 38.49 on 3 and 385 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
Figure 4. Effects plots of shifts in position on abortion based on members’ starting positions on abor-
tion in week 3 controlling for education.
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Cunningham, forthcoming), which as we have seen, resulted in significant opinion shifts
on the part of a number of the members. This was particularly evident among those
members who started the process as undecided, and it was especially noteworthy in the
case of those members with lower levels of education. Overall, there was a convergence
in views among the membership as a whole towards a highly liberal position on the ques-
tion – thus confirming H2.
The question that we now need to address is whether this outcome of the Citizens’
Assembly reflected wider public opinion; whether the views on abortion of this mini-
public were consistent with those of the maxi-public. Above we referred to Fishkin’s
well-known argument about how a deliberative mini-public ‘models what the electorate
would think if, hypothetically, it could be immersed in intensive deliberative processes’
(Fishkin, 1991, p. 81; also Fishkin, 2009). This has led some to point to the limitations
of deliberative mini-publics because by their nature they include only a small sample of
people; the wider population has not been ‘immersed in intensive deliberative processes’,
thus raising questions over whether ultimately DMPs may be pretty ‘superfluous’ (Lafont,
2020, p. 130). Another reason why this particular Citizens’ Assembly might be seen as
superfluous is the fact that (as discussed above) opinion polls showed that the majority
of Irish voters already favoured some liberalisation of abortion even before the start of
the CA’s proceedings. Therefore, did this mini-public have much of a role to play in
influencing the maxi-public?
We would suggest that it did. The opinion polls may have indicated support for abor-
tion liberalisation, but as the media commentary indicated, the view was that this was far
from a forgone conclusion. Certainly, the announcement of the results of the Citizens’
Assembly deliberations on abortion in April 2017, which proposed a radical liberalisation,
were seen at the time as dramatic.16 As one journalist remarked: ‘The results were more
liberal than most would have imagined likely’.17 Another referred to the vote as a ‘land-
mark call’.18 There was every reason to expect a tough battle in the referendum to
follow. The experience of previous Irish referendums on moral issues showed how easy
it was for public opinion to be swayed by well-resourced No campaigns (Darcy &
Laver, 1990). Furthermore, this abortion referendum campaign stood out particularly as
the first major case in Ireland in which well-resourced groups, mostly funded by far-
right Christian groupings in the US, made extensive use of social media to seek to
influence the result (Field, 2018).
In the event, the referendum vote in the summer of 2018 was definitive. There was a
near record turnout of 64 per cent. The electorate voted to repeal the 8th Amendment
by a majority of 66 per cent to 34 per cent. Analysis of survey data gathered on polling
day revealed strong support for abortion liberalisation across a range of demographics,
but most strongly among younger voters and those who are infrequent attenders of
church (Elkink, Farrell, Marien, Reidy, & Suiter, 2020). As was the case with the Cana-
dian Citizens’ Assemblies (Cutler, Johnston, Carty, Blais, & Fournier, 2008; Fournier,
Van der Kolk, Carty, Blais, & Rose, 2011), levels of knowledge were also a feature in
the referendum vote: in particular those who had good objective knowledge of the Citi-
zens’ Assembly were significantly more likely to vote Yes – to a degree an indicator of
enlightened citizens who were aware of the significance of the deliberative process that
preceded the calling of the referendum (Elkink et al., 2020). Furthermore, in their analy-
sis of this and other recent Irish referendums that were preceded by deliberative
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processes, Suiter and Reidy find that ‘integrating a deliberative democratic structure into
a mandatory referendum process can enhance referendum outcomes in the form of deli-
vering correct voting’ (2020, p. 13), by which they mean that the voters were better
informed. In short, the overall views of the mini-public coincided with those of the
maxi-public and, perhaps influenced the latter (at least the better informed members
of the public).
There is a remaining issue, however, over whether the over-representation in the Citi-
zens’ Assembly of those with liberal views on abortion may be of concern from a legiti-
macy perspective. It is pretty apparent that the Citizens’ Assembly was a well-run
deliberative process that achieved high levels of satisfaction amongst its members with
regard to the quality of the deliberations and the deliberative process (Farrell et al., forth-
coming). And the selection of the Assembly members using stratified random sampling
achieved representation in terms of the Parliamentary-defined relevant descriptive charac-
teristics (age, gender, region etc.). But the recruitment process did not include a potential
member’s opinion on the 8th amendment as a selection characteristic. Arguably, this was a
shortcoming that could be remedied for future citizens’ assemblies.19 Nonetheless, it did
not fully detract from the Assembly’s deliberative quality and representativeness. As
Warren notes, a democratic body includes ‘ways and means of representing all affected
interests’ (2008, p. 58). This is true of the Assembly: ‘conservative’ views within the mem-
bership and in the invited expert witnesses, civil society groups and personal testimonies
ensured the inclusion of ‘conservative’ perspectives in the deliberations and that the range
of perspectives within this group were represented.
It is perhaps a strength of the Citizens’ Assembly that despite the composition not being
fully representative of the general population there was still significant evidence of attitu-
dinal change. Substantial numbers of those that were undecided on the issue did change
their view, particularly those with lower levels of educational attainment. It resulted in
conclusions that were, definitively, the same as among the general public. Most signifi-
cantly from a legitimacy perspective, it both expedited and informed a process that ulti-
mately led to a successful popular referendum on the matter.
Notes
1. The Irish Constitution can only be changed by a referendum. In recent years the numbers of
referendums have increased significantly, in part a product of social modernization (Elkink
et al., 2020; Gallagher, forthcoming), in part too reflecting the practice of Irish politicians to
use referendums as a device to avoid taking difficult decisions themselves (McGraw, 2015).
2. For more discussion of the Citizens’ Assembly, its descriptive similarity to the wider popu-
lation and the quality of its deliberations see Farrell et al. (forthcoming).
3. Prominent examples of this include the 2017 citizens’ assembly on Brexit (https://




6. We don’t have the data to assess which of these perspectives might apply.
7. While there could be grounds for arguing that someone opposed to constitutional change on
abortion may not necessarily hold to a conservative, pro-life position, when we compare
responses to this question with responses to a separate battery of abortion-related questions
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(which had binary agree/disagree options) it is clear that this is a good measure of a conser-
vative position.
8. The survey was implemented by Ireland Thinks, a market research company. A random
sample of 1,029 adults (aged 18+) were surveyed by telephone between 27 February and 3
March 2017.
9. It is notable that this opinion poll was not dissimilar to subsequent public opinion polls. Thir-
teen public opinion polls were conducted by five different polling companies over the period
up to the referendum itself. The average across the polls included 65 per cent in favour of
change and 35 per cent opposed. The result itself was also 65 per cent in favour, 35 per
cent opposed (Field, 2018).
10. The multi-level model is grouped at the level of the individual members: the reason for this is
because our sample consists of repeated observations of the same individuals.
11. Over the course of the five weekends, an additional 24 members were recruited (Farrell et al.,
2019).
12. As a further test we replicated this analysis using our constitutional change question as a
proxy for abortion, thus allowing us to track trends from the start of week one. This produced
similar findings.
13. We are grateful to one of our referees for this suggestion.
14. A separate model including all demographics as controls (including age and gender) found
no significant relationships.
15. It is worth pointing out that the challenges also relate to the research that was commissioned
to track and evaluate the process. For the organizers of government-sponsored Citizens’
Assemblies of this type the primary duty is to ensure that the process works successfully
(which was the case here). But this can lead to a tension with those charged with carrying
out research and evaluation of the process, which in this instance impacted on the types
of questions (and in some instances even the wording of the questions) that could be
asked of the members.
16. https://2016-2018.citizensassembly.ie/en/The-Eighth-Amendment-of-the-Constitution/The-
Eighth-Amendment-of-the-Constitution.html
17. Ronan McGreevy, ‘Oireachtas given a mandate to change the eighth amendment’, Irish
Times. 24 April 2017.
18. Leah McDonald, ‘Citizens’ Assembly: 64% want abortion without restriction’, Irish Daily
Mail. 24 April 2017.
19. For example, and as noted above, the 2019–20 UK Climate Assembly included attitudes to
climate change as a selection criterion (more generally, see Paulis et al., 2020).
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